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This is a bibliography of material where issues in moral philosophy are engaged with the theoretical tools of the cognitive sciences. Most items bear primarily on moral psychology and epistemology. The authors included here are applying concepts and theories from the cognitive sciences in ethics, rather than investigating research and theories in those sciences from a moral point of view.
The bibliography is organized into the following seven sections:
Since these different subject areas overlap, some items may fit in several of them but are only listed once.
Campbell, Richmond and Hunter, Bruce (eds). 2000. Moral Epistemology Naturalized. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume XXVI.
Casebeer, William D. 2003. Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. Cambridge: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press. Amazon.com. MIT Press.
Casebeer, William D. 2003. Moral cognition and its neural constituents. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4.
Casebeer, William, and Churchland, Patricia. 2003. The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multi-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-making. Biology and Philosophy.
Changeux, Jean-Pierre, and Ricoeur, Paul. 2000. What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. Princeton University Press.
Churchland, Patricia S. 2002. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Churchland, Paul M. 1996. Flanagan on Moral Knowledge. In (Robert McCauley, ed) The Churchlands and Their Critics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell. 302-306.
Doris, John, and Stich, Stephen. 2001. Ethics. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, volume 2. London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 29-35.
Doris, John, and Stich, Stephen. 2005. As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics. In (F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Doris, John, and Stich, Stephen. 2003. Ethics and Psychology. In Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Online.
Flanagan, Owen. 1991. Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Flanagan, Owen. 1996. Ethics Naturalized: Ethics as Human Ecology. In Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. A slightly different version appears in (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 19-44).
Flanagan argues for a naturalized ethics in general and presents and discusses Paul Churchland's "moral network theory" in particular.
Flanagan, Owen. 1996. The Moral Network. In (Robert McCauley, ed) The Churchlands and Their Critics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell.
Very similar to the paper above, Ethics Naturalized: Ethics as Human Ecology.
Flanagan, Owen. 2002. The Problem of The Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. Basic Books.
Flanagan, Owen. 2005. The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness. In (D. K. Nauriyal, Michael Drummond, Y. B. Lal, eds) The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age. London: Routledge.
Flanagan, Owen. Forthcoming. The Bodhisattva's Brain: Neuroscience, Virtue and Happiness. MIT Press.
Flanagan, Owen. Forthcoming. Human Flourishing in the Age of Mind Science. MIT Press.
Flanagan, Owen, Hagop Sarkissian and David Wong. Forthcoming. Naturalizing Ethics. In (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed) Psychology and Biology of Morality. MIT Press.
Goldman, Alvin. 1993. Ethics and Cognitive Science. Ethics 103, 337-360. Reprinted in (A. Goldman, ed) Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993).
Goldman, Alvin. 1993. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Goodenough, Oliver R., and Prehn, Kristin. 2004. A neuroscientific approach to normative judgement in law and justice. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 359, 1709–1726.
Greene, J.D. 2003. From neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 4, 847-850.
Harman, Gilbert. 2004. Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy. Value Inquiry, 37 (3), pp. 415-425.
Held, Virginia. 1996. Whose agenda? Ethics versus Cognitive Science. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Hundert, Edward M. 1995. Lessons from an optical illusion: On Nature and Nurture, Knowledge and Values. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Johnson, Mark. 1996. How Moral Psychology Changes Moral Theory. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 45-68.
Johnson, Mark. 1998. Ethics. In (William Bechtel and George Graham, ed) A Companion to Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
May, Larry, Friedman, Marilyn, and Clark, Andy (eds). 1996. Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
This is an anthology on cognitive science, ethics, and naturalism. The anthology is divided into four sections: "Ethics Naturalized", "Moral judgements, Representations, and Prototypes", "Moral Emotions", and "Agency and Responsibility". An excellent collection.
Preston, Beth and Davion, Victoria. 1997. Review of Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited by L. May, M. Friedman, and A. Clark. Minds and Machines 7 (3), 447-451.
Roberts, David H. Ethics & The Empirical: Dewey, Cognitive Science, and the Wrath of Held.
Rottschaefer, William A. 1998. The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rottschaefer, William A. 1999. Moral Learning and Moral Realism: How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues In Moral Ontoloy. Behavior and Philosophy, 27, 19-49.
Rottschaefer, William A. 2000. Naturalizing Ethics: The Death of Ethics and the Resurrection of Moral Science. Zygon, 35, 253-286.
Rottschaefer, William A. 2002. Selection Explanations and the Scientific Naturalization of Ethics. Scandinavian Journal of Cross Cultural Ethics and Value Study, Issue 1, November 2002.
Schueler, G.F. 1997. Review of Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited by L. May, M. Friedman, and A. Clark. Ethics 107 (2), 349-351.
Edward Slingerland. Work in progress. Of What Use are the Odes? Modern Cognitive Science, Virtue Ethics, and Early Confucian Moral Training.
Sterba, James P. 1996. Justifying Morality and The Challenge of Cognitive Science. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Timothy J. Taylor. The Role of Moral Psychology in Theories of Practical Reason.
Timmons, Mark. 1997. Will Cognitive Science Change Ethics? A review essay of Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, edited by L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark. Philosophical Psychology 10, 531-540.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Forthcoming. Moral Psychology, Voume 1: The Evolution of Morality, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality, Volume 3: Morality in the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, Paul M. 1989. Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge. In A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Seven pages on what a neurophilosophically informed account of moral knowledge might look like.
Churchland, Paul M. 1995. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Churchland, Paul M. 1996. The Neural Representation of the Social World. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Reprinted in (Peter Danielson, ed) Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and in (Terrell W. Bynum and James Moor, eds) The Digital Phoenix: How Computers Are Changing Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
This is an excerpt from chapter 6 and 10 of "The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul".
Churchland, Paul M. 1998. Replies. MacIntyre on Virtues and Rules. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (4), 893-5. Reply to Alasdair MacIntyre's (1998) comments on the speculations on moral theory in "The Engine of Reason, The Seat of The Soul".
Churchland, Paul M. 1998. Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues. Topoi 17, 83-96. Reprinted in (Joao Branquinho, ed) The Foundations of Cognitive Science (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Similar to Churchland's earlier papers (1989, 1996) on moral cognition, but also includes some discussion of the views of Alasdair MacIntyre.
Churchland, Paul M. 2000. Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition. In (R. Campbell and B. Hunter, eds) Moral Epistemology Naturalized, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume XXVI.
Clark, Andy. 1996. Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem Solving. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Clark, Andy. 2000. Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition. In (R. Campbell and B. Hunter, eds) Moral Epistemology Naturalized, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume XXVI.
This is Clark's embodied and situated version of cognitive theory applied to moral cognition. He argues against Dreyfus & Dreyfus and Churchland on the importance of rules and lingua-form representations in moral cognition. Goes beyond Clark (1996) to argue that language "discursively construct" the very phenomenon of morality. Very interesting, highly recommended!
Clark, Andy. 2000. Making Moral Space: A Reply to Churchland. In (R. Campbell and B. Hunter, eds) Moral Epistemology Naturalized, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume XXVI.
Dancy, Jonathan. 1998. Can a Particularist Learn The Difference between Right and Wrong?. In (Klaus Brinkmann, ed) Proceedings from the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Volume I: Ethics. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 59-72.
Argues against Jackson, Pettit and Smith that it is possible to aquire moral knowledge even if there are no general moral principles. Shows how connectionism and notions of prototypes in psychology gives support to the possibility of moral particularism.
Daniels, N. 1980. On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics. Philosophical Studies, 37.
DeMoss, David. 1998. Aristotle, Connectionism, and the Morally Excellent Brain. The Paideia Archive.
DesAutels, Peggy. 1996. Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception. In (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
DesAutels, Peggy. 1998. Psychologies of Moral Perceivers. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXII, 266-279.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Dreyfus, Stuart. 1990. What is Morality? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise. In (David Rasmussen, ed) Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary debates in ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Revised and reprinted in (James Ogilvy, ed) Revisioning Philosophy (State University of New York Press, 1992).
Discusses the role of rules and judgements in moral life with reference to the Gilligan-Kohlberg debate. There is no explicit discussion of, or reference to, connectionism but this paper is often treated as espousing a connectionist account of moral cognition (see for example Clark (1996, 2000) and Haney (1999)).
Dwyer, Susan. 1999. Moral Competence. In (K. Murasugi and R. Stainton, eds) Philosophy and Linguistics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. pp. 1-34.
Gert, Joshua. 2002. Expressivism and Language Learning. Ethics, 112(2):292-312.
Guarini, Marcello. 1996. Mind, Morals, and Reasons. In (Dov M. Gabbay and Hans Jurgen Ohlbach, eds) Practical Reasoning, part of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag (Proceedings of the International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning, FAPR 1996). Abstract online.
Haney, Mitchell R. 1999. Dynamical Cognition, Soft Laws, and Moral Theorizing. Acta Analytica 14 (22). Extract online (PDF).
Harman, Gilbert. 1999. Moral Philosophy and Linguistics . In (Klaus Brinkmann, ed) Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Volume I: Ethics. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 107-115. Reprinted in Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
Harman, Gilbert. 2005. Moral Particularism and Transduction. Philosophical Issues, a supplement to Nous.
Harman, Gilbert. Forthcoming. Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality. In (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed) Moral Psychology, Volume 1, The Evolution of Morality.
Hauser, Marc. Forthcoming. Moral Minds: The Unconscious Voice of Right and Wrong. New York: Harper Collins.
Horgan, Terry and Tienson, John. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Implications of connectionism for conceptual analysis and philosophical theory, including moral theory, is briefly laid out in Section 8.3.
Howell, Steve R. Neural Networks and Philosophy: Why Aristotle was a connectionist.
Khin Zaw, Susan. 1998. Is reason gendered? - Ideology and deliberation. Res Publica IV (2), 167-197.
From the abstract: "A practically-based model of reason is proposed via a re-analysis of an ideological argument between "liberal" and "radical" feminists over reason and gender, as described by Alison Jaggar [...] The re-analysis concludes by drawing on recent developments in connectionist modelling and cognitive science to illuminate the proposed model of reason..."
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1998. What Can Moral Philosophers Learn from the Study of the Brain? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4), 865-9.
Mikhail, J., Sorentino, C., and Spelke, E. 1998. Toward a universal moral grammar. In (Morton Ann Gernsbacher and Sharon J. Derry, eds) Proceedings, Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 1250-.
Mikhail, John. 2000. Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the "Generative Grammar" Model of Moral Theory Described by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. Cornell University, PhD Dissertation.
Mikhail, John. 2002. Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Battery and the Principle of Double Effect. Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 762385. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=762385
Mikhail, John. 2002. Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner's 'The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory'. Stanford Law Review, 54:1057. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877011
Potrc, Matjaž. Draft. Particularism and Productivity Argument.
Ramsey, William. 1992. Prototypes and conceptual analysis. Topoi 11, 59-70.
Ramsey, William. 1996. Conceptual Analysis and The Connectionist Account of Concepts. In (A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, J. Larrazabal, eds) Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasonig - Proceedings of the Second International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Explores the possible implications of connectionism for the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy (not moral philosophy in particular).
Ridge, Michael. 2004. How Children Learn The Meanings of Moral Words: Expressivist Semantics for Children. Ethics, 114 (2), 301-17.
Stich, Stephen. 1993. Moral Philosophy and Mental Representation. In (Michael Hechter, Lynn Nadel and Richard E. Michod, eds) The Origin of Values. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Thagard, Paul. 1999. Ethical coherence. Philosophical Psychology 11, 405-422.
Ward, Andrew. 2005. Defending Ethical Naturalism: The Roles of Cognitive Science and Pragmatism. Zygon, 40 (1), 201-
Discussion of Churchland’s neurophilosophical moral theory, the naturalistic fallacy, pragmatism, and the postmodern ethics of Jean-François Lyotard (!).
Aydede, Murat. 2000. An Analysis of Pleasure vis-à-vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXI, No. 3, November 2000, 537-570.
Bengtsson, David. 2004. Pleasure and The Phenomenology of Value. In (Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen, eds) Patterns of value – essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis vol 2. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2004:1.
Berridge, Kent. 2004. Motivational Concepts in Behavioral Neuroscience. Physiology & Behavior 81(2), 179-209.
Blair, R. 1995. A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition, 57, 1-29.
Blair, R., L. Jones, F. Clark, & M. Smith. 1997. The psychopathic individual: A lack of responsiveness to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 34, 192-198.
Blair, R.J.R., Colledge, E. and Mitchell, D.G.V. 2001. Somatic Markers and Response Reversal: Is There Orbitofrontal Cortex Dysfunction in Boys With Psychopathic Tendencies. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29 (6), 499-511.
Churchland, Patricia S. 1996. Feeling reasons. In (A. Damasio, H. Damasio and Y. Christen, eds) Neurobiology of Decision-Making. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 181-199. Reprinted in (Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, eds) On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998).
Damasio, Antonio R. 1994. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and The Human Brain. New York: Avon Books.
D'Arms, Justin. 2000. Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry. Chicago-Kent Law Review, Symposium on Law, Psychology and the Emotions: 74 (4), 1467-1500.
Eslinger, Paul J. 1998. Neurological and neuropsychological bases of empathy. Eur Neurol, 39 (4), 193-9.
Eslinger, Paul J., Moll, Jorge et de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo. 2002. Emotional and Cognitive Processing in Empathy and Moral Behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4 p.
Farrow, Tom F.D., Zheng, Ying, Wilkinson, Iain D., Spence, Sean A., Deakin, J.F. William, Tarrier, Nick, Griffiths, Paul D. et Woodruff, Peter W.R. 2001. Investigating the functional anatomy of empathy and forgiveness. NeuroReport, 12 (11), 2433-38.
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. W. W. Norton: New York.
Goldman, Alvin. 1992. Empathy, Mind, and Morals. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66:17-41. Reprinted in (M. Davies and T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation: Philosophical and Psychological Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp. 185-208).
Goldman, Alvin. 1995. Simulation and Interpersonal Utility. Ethics 105, 709-726. Reprinted in (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996).
Gordon, Robert. 1995. Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator. Ethics 105 (Summer). Reprinted in (L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996).
Hoffman, Martin L. 1991. Empathy, social cognition and moral action, In (W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz, eds) Handbook of Moral Behavior & Development (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
Hoffman, Martin L. 1993. The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment. In (A. Goldman, ed) Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 647-80.
Hoffman, Martin L. 2000. Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Katz, Leonard. 1986. Hedonism as metaphysics of mind and value. Unpublished dissertation.
Kennett, Jeanette. 2002. Autism, Empathy, and Moral Agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 340-357.
Knobe, Joshua. 2005. Theory of Mind and Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 357-359.
Levy, Neil. 2005. Imaginative resistance and the moral/conventional distinction. Philosophical Psychology, 18(2):231-241.
Maibom, Heidi L. 2005. Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy. Mind & Language, 20(2).
Mason, Sheila. 1997. The Self and Contemporary Theories of Ethics. In (Ulric Neisser, and David A. Jopling, eds) The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding (Cambridge University Press, pp. 233-248).
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Eslinger, P.J., Bramati, I.E., Mourao-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P.A. et Pessoa, L. 2002. The neural correlates of moral sensitivity: a functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic moral emotions. Journal of Neuroscience, 22 (7), 2730-7.
Morton, Adam. 1998. Default Assumptions of Good Behavior. Paper presented at The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona 1996.
Nichols, Shaun. Draft. Mindreading and the Core Architecture of Moral Psychology.
Nichols, Shaun. 2001. Mindreading and the Cognitive Architecture underlying Altruistic Motivation. Mind & Language 16, 425-455.
Nichols, Shaun. 2002. Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment. Cognition, 84, 221-236.
Nichols, Shaun. 2002. How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? The Monist 85, 285-304.
Nichols, Shaun. 2002. Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment. Cognition, 84, 221-236.
Nichols, Shaun. 2004. Sentmental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explorations, Special Issue: Empirical Research and the Nature of Moral Judgment, 9(1), March 2006.
Contents:
Philip
Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett, Introduction: Is cognitive
penetrability the mark of the moral? pp. 3-12
James Blair, A. A.
Marsh, E. Finger, K. S. Blair, J. Luo, Neuro-cognitive systems
involved in morality, pp. 13-27
Jesse Prinz, The emotional basis
of moral judgments, pp. 29-43
Karen Jones, Metaethics and emotions
research: A response to Prinz, pp. 45-53
Valerie Stone, The moral
dimensions of human social intelligence: Domain-specific and
Domain-general Mechanisms, pp. 55-68
Jeanette Kennett, Do
psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism? pp. 69-82
Cordelia
Fine, Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?:
Reason in moral judgment, pp. 83-98
Neil Levy, The wisdom of the
pack, pp. 99-103
Laurence Fiddick, Adaptive domains of deontic
reasoning, pp. 105-116
Garrett Cullity, As you were?: Moral
philosophy and the aetiology of moral experience, pp. 117-132
Richard
Joyce, Metaethics and the empirical sciences, pp. 133-148.
Prinz, Jesse. 2005. Passionate thoughts: The embodiment of moral concepts. In (Diane Pecher and Rolf Zwaan, eds) Grounding Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language and Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 93-114.
Prinz, Jesse. 2006. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Roskies, Adina. 2003. Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "aquired sociopathy". Philosophical Psychology, 16 (1), 51-66.
Rozin, Paul, Lowery, Laura, Imada, Sumio and Haidt, Jonathan. 1999. The CAD Traid Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76 (4), 574-86.
Sherman, Nancy. 2002. Empathy and Imagination. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXII.
Thompson, Evan (ed). 2001. Between Ourselves: Second-person issues in the study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic. Editor's introduction.
Annas, Julia. 2003. Virtue ethics and social psychology. A Priori, volume 2, January 2003.
Athanassoulis, Nafsika. 2000. A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character Traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 215-221.
Darley, John M. & C. Daniel Batson. 1973. From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 100-119.
Doris, John. 1998. Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Nous 32.
Doris, John. 2002. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1999. Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, 315-331. Reprinted in Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 2000).
Harman, Gilbert. 2000. The Nonexistence of Character Traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 223-226.
Harman, Gilbert. 2001. Virtue Ethics without Character Traits. In (Byrne, Stalnaker, and Wedgewood, eds) Fact and Value. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 117-127.
Harman, Gilbert. 2003. No Character or Personality. Business Ethics Quarterly 13, 87-94.
Harman, Gilbert. 2005. My Virtue Situation. Autobiographical remarks by Harman, describing his education in virtue ethics, an expurgated (or at least edited) version of a talk at a conference in Denver, "Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate," October 7-8, 2005.
Kamtekar, Rachena. 2004. Situationism, Virtue Ethics, and the Content of Our Character. Ethics, 114 (3), 458-492.
Knobe, Joshua, and Leiter, Brian. (forthcoming). The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology. In (Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu, eds) Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Merritt, Maria W. 1999. Virtue Ethics and the Social Psychology of Character. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. Summary.
Merritt, Maria W. 2000. Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (December), 365-383.
Miller, Christian. 2003. Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics. The Journal of Ethics, 7 (4), 365-392.
Montmarquet, James. 2003. Moral Character and Social Science Research. Philosophy, 78 (3), 355-368.
Solomon, R. 2003. Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business. Business Ethics Quarterly.
Sreenivasan, Gopal. 2002. Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution. Mind 111, 47-68.
Vranas, Peter. Forthcoming. The Indeterminacy Paradox: Character Evaluations and Human Psychology. Noûs.
Alexander, Jason. 2000. Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice. Philosophy of Science, 67 (3), 490-516.
Alldredge, Stacey; Derryberry, W. Pitt; Crowson, Michael; and Iran-Nejad, Asghar. 2000. Rethinking the Origin of Morality and Moral Development. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 20, (1,2), 105-128.
Arnhart, Larry. 1998. Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature. New York: State University Press.
Aurreli, Filippo and De Wall, Frans B. M. (eds). 2000. Natural Conflict Resolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Boehm, Christopher. 1999. Hierachy in the Forest. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Campbell, Richmond. 1985. Sociobiology and the Possibility of Ethical Naturalism. In (D. Copp, and D. Zimmerman, eds) Morality, Reason, and Truth. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. 270-96
Campbell, Richmond. 1996. Can Biology Make Ethics Objective? Biology and Philosophy, 11, 21-31.
Campbell, Richmond, and Woodrow, Jennifer. Forthcoming. Why Moore’s Open Question Is Open: The Evolution of Moral Supervenience. The Journal of Value Inquiry.
Collier, John, and Stingl, Michael. 1993. Evolutionary Naturalism and the Objectivity of Morality. Biology and Philosophy, 8, 47-60. Reprinted in (P. Thompson, ed) Issues in Evolutionary Ethics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995, 111-50).
Cosmides, Leda, and Tooby, John. 1992. Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In (J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. Freedom Evolves. Viking Press.
de Waal, Frans. 1996. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Flanagan, Owen. 2003. Ethical expressions: why moralists scowl, frown and smile. In (J. Hodge and G. Radick, ed) Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press.
Harms, William F. (2000). Adaptation and Moral Realism. Biology and Philosophy, 15, 699-712.
Hauser, Marc D. 2005. Moral Ingredients: How We Evolved the Capacity to Do the Right Thing. In (Stephen C. Levinson and Pierre Jaisson, eds) Evolution and Culture: A Fyssen Foundation Symposium. MIT Press. pp 219-246.
Horst, Steven. 1998. Our Animal Bodies. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXII.
Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. MIT Press.
Katz, Leonard D. (ed). 2000. Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives. Imprint Academic. Editor's introduction.
Kitcher, Philip. 1984. Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books, MIT Press.
Kitcher, Philip. 1993. The Evolution of Human Altruism. The Journal of Philosophy, 90, 497-516.
Kitcher, Philip. 1998. Psychological Altruism, Evolutionary Origins, and Moral Rules. Philosophical Studies, 89, 283-316.
Kitcher, Philip. 2003. Giving Darwin his due. In (J. Hodge and G. Radick, ed) Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press.
Kitcher, Philip, and Batali, John. 1995. Evolution of Altruism in Optional and Compulsory Games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, September 1995.
Midgley, Mary. 1978. Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. New York: Cornell University Press.
Nesse, Randolph M. (ed). 2001. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Info page.
Nichols, Shaun. 2005. Innateness and Moral Psychology. In (Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, eds) The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. Oxford University Press.
Prinz, Jesse. Draft. Against Moral Nativism.
Richards, Robert. 1986. A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics. Biology and Philosophy, 1, 265-293.
Ridley, Matt. 1997. The Origins of Virtue. New York: Viking Penguin.
Rosenberg, Alex. 1991. The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario. Social Policy and Philosophy, 8, 86-101.
Rosenberg, Alex. 2003. Darwinism in moral philosophy and social theory. In (J. Hodge and G. Radick, ed) Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press.
Ruse, Michael and Wilson, E. O. 1986. Moral Philosophy as Applied Science. Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 61, 173-192.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. Draft. Evolution and rational agency.
Skyrms, Brian. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sober, Eliott, and Wilson, David S. 1998. Unto Others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Stich, Stephen. To appear. Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kludge? Cognition and Culture.
Stingl, Michael. 1996. Evolutionary Ethics and Moral Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry, 30, 531-45.
Wilson, Edward O. 1978. On Human Nature. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Wilson, Edward O. 1998. The Biological Basis of Morality. The Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved July 25, 2000 from the World Wide Web: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98/apr/biomoral.html.
Wright, Robert. 1994. The Moral Animal. New York: Pantheon.
Björklund, Fredrik. 2000. Moral Cognition: Individual Differences, Intuition and Reasoning in Moral Judgment. Lund University, PhD Dissertation.
Björklund, Fredrik. 2004. Intuition and Ex-post facto reasoning in Moral Judgment: Some experimental Findings. In (Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen, eds) Patterns of value – essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis vol 2. Lund Philosophy Reports, 2004:1.
DePaul, Michael R. and William Ramsey (eds.). 1998. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, L. E. Nystrom, J. M. Darley, and J. D. Cohen. 2001. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.
Greene, Joshua. 2005. Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind. In (Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, eds) The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. Oxford University Press.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Psychological Review, 198 (4), 814-34.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2003. The Emotional Dog Learns New Tricks. Psychological Review, 110 (1), 197–198.
Kamm, Frances Myra. 1998. Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction. Ethics, 108 (3), 463-488.
Knobe, Joshua. (forthcoming). Ordinary Ethical Reasoning and the Ideal of 'Being Yourself'. Philosophical Psychology.
Pizarro, D. A., and Paul Bloom. 2003. The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A reply to Haidt (2001). Psychological Review, 110, 193–196.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006. Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology. In (T. Horgan, and M. Timmons, eds) Metaethics After Moore. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 339-365.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Jana Schaich Borg, Catherine Hynes, John van Horn, and Scott Grafton. Forthcoming. Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.
Sunstein, Cass. 2004. Moral Heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
Anderson, James. 1997. What Cognitive Science Tells Us about Ethics and the Teaching of Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 16 (3), 279-291.
Brown, Curtis. 1995. Review of Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Philosophical Psychology vol. 8, issue 1.
Childress, James. 1997. Practical Reasoning in Bioethics. Indiana University Press.
No explicit cognitive science content but discusses the use of metaphors, analogies and principles in ethical reasoning with references to Lakoff and Johnson.
Johnson, Mark. 1993. Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Table of contents (Word document).
Koppfensteiner, Thomas. 1995. Science, Metaphor and Moral Casuistry. In (James F. Keenan and Thomas Shannon, eds) The Context of Casuistry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. pp. 207-220.
Koppfensteiner, Thomas. 1997. The Metaphorical Structure of The Natural Law. Theological Studies, 58, 331-46.
Lakoff, George. 1990. Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf. Distributed by electronic mail, December, 1990. Reprinted in (H. Kreisler, ed) Confrontation in the Gulf: University of California Professors Talk about the War. (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1992), in (B. Hallet, ed) Engulfed in War: Just War and the Persian Gulf (Honolulu: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1991), in Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies 2 (1) (1991), in Vietnam Generation Newsletter 3 (2) (1991), and in The East Bay Express, February, 1991.
Lakoff, George. 1995. Metaphor, Morality, and Politics, Or, Why Conservatives Have Left Liberals In the Dust. Social Research 62 (2), 177-214.
Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don't. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George. 2001. Metaphors of Terror.
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. 1999. Philosophy in The Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books.
Nordgren, Anders. 1998. Ethics and Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Semantics for Medical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (2), 117-141.
Develops a new method based on cognitive semantics (Johnson, 1993) for medical ethics called 'imaginative casuistry'.
Nordgren, Anders. 2001. Responsible Genetics: The Moral Responsibility of Geneticists for the Consequences of Human Genetics Research. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
More on imaginative casuistry and cognitive semantics in connection with bioethics.
Rethorst, John. 1997. Art and Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Moral Education. In (Susan Laird, ed) Philosophy of education (yearbook). Urbana-Champaign, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.
Rohrer, Tim. 1995. The Metaphorical Logic of (Political) Rape: The New Wor(l)d Order. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10 (2).
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1994. Review of Mark Johnson's Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Mind 103 (411), 381-384.
Winter, Steven L. 2001. A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Application of cognitive semantic theory to law and legal reasoning.
Allen, C., Varner, G. & Zinser, J. 2000. Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12, 251-261.
Danielson, Peter. 1992. Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games. London: Routledge.
Danielson, Peter (ed). 1998. Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
von Foerster, Heinz. 1992. Ethics and Second-order Cybernetics. Cybernetics & Human Knowing: A Journal of Second Order Cybernetics & Cyber-Semiotics 1 (1). Reprinted in The Stanford Humanities Review 4 (2), 1995.
Jensen, Mads Storgaard. 1999. Ethics and Cognition: A Philosophical and Semiotic Analysis of Action-Related Meanings. Ph.D. dissertation. Center for Semiotics, University of Aarhus. Extract online (PDF).
Hurley, Susan L. 1999. Rationality, Democracy, and Leaky Boundaries: Vertical vs. Horizontal Modularity. Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (2), 126-146. A slightly different version appears in (Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds) Democracy's Edges (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Rowlands, Mark. 2000. The Environmental Crisis: Understanding the Value of Nature. Macmillan/St Martin's Press.
Rowlands tries to answer the question: what must the relation between mind and world be if the world is to have non-instrumental, non-subjective value? His answer is based on various forms of externalism, Clark & Chalmers' active externalism among others.
Rutherford, James H. 1999. An Ecological Organic Paradigm: A framework of analysis for moral and political philosophy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10).
Thyssen, Ole. 1992. Ethics as Second Order Morality. Cybernetics & Human Knowing: A Journal of Second Order Cybernetics & Cyber-Semiotics 1 (1).
Varela, Fransisco J. 1999. Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, and Cognition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Walter, Henrik. 2001. Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Since March 21, 2006.