By Dr.
Niclas Berggren
Introduction
I, like almost every other human being, hold certain moral values,
and it is my ambition to try to spell them out in this little essay. I
wish to propose that these values of mine are superior to imaginable and
existing alternatives, but I have no great hopes that I shall be able to
convince many people of this. This slight pessimism stems from my conviction
that it is impossible to argue convincingly about values; on this, I share
the meta-ethical view of Professor
A. J. Ayer. That is to say, if a person really holds that performing
act x is morally wrong, and if I hold that performing it is morally
right, then there is no way for me, through argument, to alter the other
person’s moral conviction, to the extent that it corresponds to a pure
value.
But why then present my moral values, if I do not expect such a presentation
successful in affecting the moral values of others? On the one hand, it
gives some possibly interesting knowledge about my way of thinking for
those who know and encounter me. But perhaps more importantly, the general
reasoning about morality might help some people to change their moral views,
not by inducing them to change their moral values but by showing that if
they agree with my values, then certain of their evaluations of acts may
have to be altered.
Let me stress at the outset that I only discuss my moral values as they
pertain to personal matters. This means that I do not touch upon
the, in some sense, larger issue of political moral values; instead, I
focus on how to best think morally for oneself, when one acts alone and
when one acts such that others are affected by what one does. But I do
not give my views on the criteria against which I think public policy should
be judged, although such criteria of course more or less directly correspond
to my personal moral values.
Let me begin by clarifying that I am an atheist and a moral subjectivist,
which means that I do not think there is any divine, or extra-human, source
of morality. Rather, I view all moral values as the result of biological
and cultural evolution, while their spread is assisted by modes of upbringing
or some sort of moral education. That is to say, I believe that humans,
sometimes but certainly not always consciously, create the moral systems
that exist on the basis of moral emotions. This implies that a moral value
cannot be said to be true or false — one can only give one’s personal approval
or disapproval of it, on the basis of some possibly different value. All
the reasoning of this essay presupposes moral subjectivism. For more on
this meta-ethical view, see my essay "On
the Nature of Morality".
Some terminological clarifications are in order. First, I take "moral value"
to refer to a normative assessment about the rightness or wrongness of
some human action. Second, by "moral intuition" I mean a fairly spontaneous
emotional reaction to some specific act and circumstance, entailing a feeling
of dislike, indifference, or approval. Third, by "moral principle", I mean
a formalization of the set of moral intuitions, i.e., an attempt to transform
the basic, unifying moral value inherent in the set of intuitions into
a comprehensive formulation. Fourth, a "moral statement" is a thought or
utterance, orally or in writing, of a moral position, either based on intuition
or on principle. And fifth, a "moral view" is a term which covers the whole
machinery of moral thinking and reaction, both intuitions and principle.
It is the set of moral statements.
Furthermore, moral values are naturally involved in all moral intuitions
and all moral principles (since the latter build on the former), and in
these things only: that is what they are all about. Any moral statement
involves not only a value but also an assessment of facts, more consciously
so when the basis is a moral principle than when the basis is a moral intuition.
And any moral value is emotional in character, untouchable by reasoning.
My Personal Moral Values
It is possible to summarize my personal moral values in quite a brief manner,
in the form of two closely related moral principles. Two sections elaborate
somewhat on them.
Acting on one’s own
First, regarding acts that a human carries out without their affecting
any other human negatively. In such cases, I hold that a person should
strive to act in such a way that he or she maximizes his or her long-term
utility. I hesitate to call acts carried out in this manner "moral"
and other acts "immoral", but I would clearly say that a person who acts
in accordance with this view acts properly and morally irreproachably and
that a person who does not act in accordance with this view could do better
for him- or herself — in my view.
What does this view entail? The term "maximizes" implies that in allocating
time and resources between different alternatives, it is advisable not
only to spend them such that long-term utility increase as a result, but
that they should rather be used such that long-term utility increase the
most as a result. Of course, no person is in possession of perfect
information, neither perhaps about his or her own values and how they develop
over time, nor about how acts in accordance with them are best realized.
So what can be said, realistically, is that a person should act so as to
achieve the highest possible long-term utility for him- or herself, given
information constraints. Another thing to note is that the evaluation
of actions depend on an intrahuman source of evaluation: it is how
each person him- or herself perceives the effects of any action to affect
his or her own long-term utility that matters, nothing else. Naturally,
such perceptions may use the advice of others as inputs but never as definitive
factors which, themselves, affect the moral evaluation. When I use the
term "long-term", I mean that it is not proper to evaluate acts in extreme
isolation but instead in terms of the sum of their effects. For
instance, undergoing surgery may entail pain, which in itself decreases
utility in the short term; but since the expected gain far outweighs the
pain, the "long-term" utility can be expected to increase as a result,
which makes the act morally good for one. Lastly, the term "utility" denotes
the personal interest of a person, as evaluated by his or her own preferences.
If a certain act makes a person feel more satisfied, upon personal reflection,
then that act increases that person’s utility. Hence, utility is a highly
subjectivist entity, experienced by individual human beings and no one
or nothing else.
But what about the case where a person does not know what is in his or
her best long-term interest? It would be absurd to deny that there are
such cases, and there are two things I would like to say on this. First,
aside from the case of children and mentally ill persons, that such cases
in my opinion are quite rare and hence not of primary interest to us. Second,
that when such cases are recognized, I think it acceptable, in principle,
to interfere with their way of carrying out various acts — to the highest
possible extent by means of verbal attempts to persuade and, if that fails,
by means of force. There is no easy way to decide whether a person acts
in his or her best interest; such assessments are necessarily subjective
but can, nevertheless, be needed. (Note that I still do not discuss legislation
but only personal interaction. between private citizens)
Acting such that others are affected negatively
Second, regarding acts that a human carries out which affects at least
some other human negatively. This is, admittedly, a trickier set of acts.
Here, my moral principle can be summarized thus: a person should strive
to act in such a way that he or she maximizes his or her long-term utility,
but in the case of acts that affect other people negatively, then those
acts that lead to the highest total amount of long-term utility
should be carried out.
Let me state at the outset that I am not quite certain that this formulation
captures my moral intuitions perfectly, but if it does not, then something
similar to it does. As noted above, no human has perfect information about
anything, and since this obviously includes me, I would think that this
statement may need revising in the future. For instance, it may be that
the comparison should be between the utility effect on the actor and the
average utility effect on those affected. But for now, the formulation
above will do. More generally, I think it important that one is not afraid
of being uncertain in moral, as well as in other, types of thinking. Sometimes,
there is a tendency for a false certainty in this realm of affairs, simply
because we feel that a decent moral view must give rise to absolutely precise
instructions. But since our mental an cognitive abilities are imperfect,
I think it quite acceptable with some degree of uncertainty.
What does this moral view entail? It basically says, like before, that
it is morally proper for each person to go about his or her business in
the manner which he or she perceives offers the highest net benefits (subjectively
evaluated) — but if this affects the long-term utility of at least some
other person negatively (as evaluated subjectively by him or her or them),
then this may impose a constraint on one’s actions. The constraint states
that when an act affects one’s own long-term utility positively and someone
else’s long-term utility negatively, then it should only be executed if
the positive utility gain outweighs the negative utility loss, where all
utility changes are aggregated over all persons affected by the act.
Here, it is important to introduce the two levels of moral thinking described
by Professor Richard M. Hare in his book Moral
Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981). On the one hand, there is the intuitive level of thinking,
which is the ordinary, day-to-day evaluation of the moral status of different
acts. On the other hand, there is the critical level of thinking,
which is the extraordinary evaluation of the moral status of acts associated
with the possession of high-quality information, developed mental powers,
and plenty of time for reflection. Because human beings are normally not
in possession of these three things required for critical thinking, it
is rational for us to adopt the intuitive morality which, on average, has
a better chance of guiding us successfully in life. To illustrate, our
moral intuition may tell us that theft is morally wrong, and for normal
purposes, this is a useful intuition, in line with what we would conclude
on the critical level of thinking. But some times, when we have very good
information, sufficient mental powers, and plenty of time, we may reach
the conclusion that theft is morally acceptable, such as in the case of
a starving child stealing a loaf of bread from a very rich man (when the
net utility effect can be expected to be positive). This is, then, a conclusion
reached on the basis of critical thinking, not quite in line with our everyday
intuition of theft being wrong.
How does my moral view fit in with this distinction of there being two
levels of moral thinking? Quite nicely, in that my dictum is a moral principle,
not an intuition, which really refers to the critical level of thinking,
which is compatible with more intuitive notions of morality in most, and
perhaps all, everyday cases. As noted, if it can be argued that a thief’s
utility gain from stealing is greater than the utility loss of the owner,
then it might not still follow that the act was a morally acceptable one.
The reason is that a system which accepts such instances of theft may thereby
not only encourage many instances of theft where the net utility effect
is directly negative, but it may also be the case that a risk of theft
reduces people’s willingness to invest productively and to purchase desirable
goods. In addition, many people’s well-being can be substantially reduced
if they go around and worry about their possessions being in danger of
being stolen all the time. Such effects would be negative on the whole,
which may warrant a condemnation of individuals acts of theft which, in
some instances, could yield isolated net utility gains. (Of course, one
could question whether any act of theft would yield positive net utility
effects. This is an empirical matter, and I doubt it, except in cases of
starving thieves. But these are non-existent in the Western world, at least.)
Some further clarifications may be needed. First, I take moral values as
givens. Basically, I view them as human emotions which we try to formalize
into some sort of overarching principle. As such, then, moral values are
arbitrary, viewed from the outside of a particular person, and cannot be
reproached morally in an objective manner. Second, moral intuitions are
emotional reactions from within towards particular acts, and as such they
incorporate a presumption that the act towards which the reaction occurs
is not conducive to the achievement of some moral value. Moral intuitions
are likewise arbitrary, viewed from the outside of a particular person,
and cannot be reproached morally in an objective manner. However, viewed
from the inside of a particular person, it is possible to detect, through
reasoning (as noted below), that some moral intuitions are irrational,
if they developed as intuitions in circumstances which are not applicable.
For instance, a modern Jew may feel that it is immoral to eat pork because
this idea has been installed by his or her parents, but if one realizes
that the koshrut developed for sanitary reasons in a society without
our advanced hygiene standards, then this intuition could be understood
to be irrational today. Note that the value involved here, that of "eating
food that does not cause illness since illness reduces one’s long-term
utility", is not being questioned, just a proposed moral, intuitive rule
to, supposedly, attain this value. That is to say, moral intuitions are
means to an end, i.e., the achievement of some moral value, but individual
intuitions may be discovered not to assist in this endeavor. (If a moral
intuition is irrational, another way to state this would be to say that
this individual moral intuition is inconsistent with other moral intuitions
held by the same person, or that the moral principle is an imperfect reflection
of the overall set of moral intuitions, such that the moral implication
it produces is not really apt. If this is detected, the conflict disappears.)
Third, there is no real conflict of value between the two levels of thinking,
or between moral intuitions and the moral principles I have formulated;
rather, following moral intuitions is the best way to realize the moral
value reflected in the moral principles of the critical level, given
the restrictions that reality imposes on us as everyday actors. As the
moral principles are devised on the basis of the moral values inherent
in the set of moral intuitions, the same value base characterizes intuitions
and principles. Their respective usefulness is just about a rational "division
of labor": sometimes, the principles are needed, most often the intuitions
will do nicely.
These points taken together imply that the moral value of the critical
level formulated above is acceptable to me because I think it corresponds
to my set of basic moral intuitions, at least roughly. Then, it may be
the case (although I posit that this would be a most rare phenomenon) that
I react intuitively to some act in a manner which is at odds with the implication
of the moral value of the critical level. Then — given that the realization
of such a conflict if based on sufficient information, mental powers, and
time — I may discard the particular moral intuition and decide to follow
the critically though-out moral view. Regarding the formulation of moral
principles on the basis of the set of moral intuitions, how is this done
in my case? I start with the realization that I have a set of moral intuitions,
with which I am quite familiar (because of practical experience and hypothetical
reasoning) and which entail certain values and the (often not-so-conscious)
assessment of the facts of various situations. These intuitions are emotional
in nature. I then start with the most basic case, the one where a person’s
acts affect no one but him- or herself, and try to work out if there is
some unifying principle that can be said to reflect these intuitions. I
have found that there is such a principle, as stated above. I then move
on to the more complex case of acts which affect others negatively. I then
start with the moral principle applicable to the simpler case and think
about how it can be extended. In this, I make use of the principle itself
and combine it with the basic moral principle of universalizability, as
recommended by Kant and Hare. By this I mean that a moral principle is
not partial to any particular person but that every person put in an identical
situation should be assessed similarly by the principle. Hence, I reach
the conclusion that what is good, socially, involves the maximization of
the aggregate of the long-term utilities of all affected.
But, it may be objected, how is this possible to operationalize when there
is no way to measure utility? Admittedly, utility is not an observable
entity that can be measured like, say, money, but the answer to the question
is that this is not needed for the application of the moral dictum
just stated. Of course, it would help if utility could be measured, but
since it cannot, we must be content with what can be done. And what we
can do amounts to comparing various states in terms of how they satisfy
affected people, as estimated by us. This subjective way of comparing
states means that others may reach other conclusions regarding the net
utility status of a certain state, but that is unavoidable. All we can
hope for is that as many people as possible agree with our judgment. That
this task is not hopeless is shown in the research by Professor Ken Binmore
of University College London, which suggests that humans are in possession
of empathetic preferences as the result of a process of evolution
in primitive village settings. This means that it is possible for us, to
some extent, to understand how others perceive the utility effects of acts,
and if this is so we can not only be expected to be able to estimate the
utility effects experienced by others, albeit imperfectly, but that we
can also expect to do so in a manner which is similar to that of others.
(See Ken Binmore, Game
Theory and the Social Contract, vol II: Just Playing, ch. 2, Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1998.)
Some Further Notes
If moral intuitions and moral thinking have arisen from human and cultural
evolution, in combination with human reflection and modes of upbringing,
which I believe to be the case (see Robert Wright, The
Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary
Psychology, London: Abacus, 1994 and Daniel J. Dennett, Darwin’s
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, London: Allen
Lane, 1995), and if all moral values and intuitions are purely subjective
in nature, then is there any role for rational reasoning in the realm of
ethics? Yes and no.
Yes, for the following four reasons. First, reasoning is useful for detecting
internal cases of logical inconsistencies. For instance, if it were the
case that a person held that x and that not-x at the same time, then we
could reason with him or her and say that there is something seriously
wrong with holding two contradictory moral positions at once. Either there
is no real contradiction, except in the verbal realm, and then the moral
language must be changed. Or there is a real contradiction in terms of
moral positions, and then one of the two contradictory positions must be
discarded. How can this be done? If there is some overarching moral principle
against which the two moral positions can be evaluated, then the one found
not to be in accordance with the principle must go. If there is no explicit
overarching moral principle, and if no such principle can be specified,
then it is in some sense arbitrary which position that must yield. Second,
reasoning is also very helpful in evaluating the correspondence between
facts and precise moral statements. Any actual moral statement is based
on one or more facts and a value, and whereas a value cannot be deemed
incorrect, factual appraisals can. That is, if we hold that a person condemns
act x because he incorrectly thinks that act x entails the
factual properties F, then we can show that he is incorrect in believing
that and that, therefore, act x is not worthy of condemnation. One
application would be the case when we intuitively feel that some act is
wrong but which we realize is not wrong upon further reflection, because
the circumstances of life have changed such that the act no longer is harmful
(in an overall sense). It could be, perhaps, that the intuition developed
during man’s primitive life as huntsmen and that it can now be demonstrated
to be irrational. And third, reasoning is needed when moral principles
are formulated (on the critical level), since it is not trivial to infer
what principles that are possible to distill from the set of moral intuitions.
Also, once the moral principles are in place, reasoning is helpful for
evaluating tricky, detailed acts and circumstances on the basis of these
principles (which are not operational in everyday life).
No, because we cannot use reasoning to affect pure values. Moral values
originate from deep-seated emotions, and I think that most would agree
that after childhood, such emotions are very hard, if not impossible, to
alter. Certainly, it cannot be done by means of reasoning, although perhaps
by other methods. As Bertrand
Russell has pointed out, to affect a person’s behavior, one must affect
his or her desires; giving voice to a moral conviction leads nowhere in
itself.
But are there no absolute moral prohibitions on the basis of some acts
being intrinsically evil? No, I think there are no such prohibitions. We
could perhaps wish for there to be such an objective morality, but wishing
it to be is not the same as its being. But it is important to realize that
even though there is no extra-human prohibition that we can resort to,
there is still, of course, every possibility for us to consider some acts
evil and to try to prevent their occurrence. When I consider the torture
of an innocent child, then I think that is an evil act. Not, however, because
some deity said so, or because some moral law said so, but because my moral
intuitions and values say so (and I think they are expressed roughly in
the dicta above). And since it may be part of my moral view that it is
morally acceptable to stop really evil acts by force, I may certainly consider
myself entitled to interfering with such an evil act. For this to happen,
an objective morality is superfluous.
Lastly, is there no way to offer a more detailed presentation of moral
statements which derive from the dicta above, such as a discussion of what
could be expected to contribute to the enhancement of a person’s long-term
utility? Such a presentation is certainly possible: I could list many acts
and activities which I consider morally beneficial for myself, and I could
also speculate about what would best assist someone else to achieve long-term
utility satisfaction. One example of such a discussion is presented in
an essay I have written together with Fredrik Bendz, "Taking
the Ten Commandments in Vain: A Critique of the Decalogue as a Code of
Ethics", where we evaluate the shortcomings of some biblical moral
statements and contrast these with some of our own moral beliefs. Furthermore,
I would say that I think my long-term well-being is best served by some
of the activities which are central in my life, such as developing and
maintaining strong friendships, reading stimulating books, having a challenging
job, having sex, interacting with my family, and enjoying opera and ballet.
Others surely have other things which contribute to their long-term well-being,
but it is not particularly meaningful for me to speculate on those matters
in more detail. Suffice it to say that it is the evaluation of each person
which stands at the forefront of my moral view, which means that some traditional
prohibitions, not the least in the area of sex, are easily considered immoral
to the extent that they lead to less long-term utility. As for acts which
affect others negatively, most (but not all) cases of stealing, rape, assault,
lying, and killing are immoral, in my view.
Concluding Remarks
This little essay has presented my personal moral values, as I perceive
them, and they can be summarized by the following statement: people should
act so as to increase their long-term utility (or personal well-being over
the long term) as much as possible, and if an act toward this end has negative
effects on the long-term utilities of others, then it should only be carried
out if the net utility gain is positive. This is the utilitarian principle
which I consider most in line with my moral intuitions, upon careful reflection.
However, its second part is probably impossible to apply well in everyday
life, which means that there is a rationale for "rules of thumb" which
more directly correspond to our intuitive level of thinking morally. On
average, such rules can be expected to yield outcomes in accordance with
the more detailed critical level of thinking. In other words, it is most
often safe to rely on one’s moral intuitions, but sometimes (especially
in unusual circumstances) evaluative reflection is needed to see if certain
of one’s moral statements are in line with the principle.
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