I.
When I say, to myself and others,
that I am a homosexual, what does that really mean? Does
it mean that I have chosen to lead a life in which I only
engage in sexual acts with persons of my own gender? Does it mean
that a non-chosen part of my personality is such that I
am sexually and emotionally attracted only to other men? If so,
how can the emergence of something not chosen be explained? By
biology? By psychology? Why should it be explained? Can it be
explained? And what about the possible difference between what
I believe and what is, in fact, reality?
In what follows, I shall make an, admittedly amateurish, attempt
to provide some tentative answers to these rather difficult questions,
and in doing so, I shall pay special attention to a philosophical
approach to interpreting the world called social constructionism.
In essence, constructionism claims, in this realm of affairs,
that sexuality is a social construction and that there is no essential,
innate, immutable characteristic of a person which can be termed
heterosexuality or homosexuality.[1] Rather,
these concepts are reflections of social discourse, which shapes
and creates the phenomena to which we refer and which varies substantially
with time and space.[2] In this view, the
term "sexual orientation"[3] does
not reflect an entity which exists irrespective of social circumstance.
Thus, my calling myself a homosexual today, in the context of
having been brought up in the modern West, does not mean that
this notion is applicable to ostensibly similar manifestations
in other cultures, and it does not mean that there really is such
an innate identity, other than in the socially shaped minds of
myself and others.
We see that constructionism effectually challenges the essentialist
notions which underlie much of ordinary and scientific thinking,
and in this respect, it demands of us that we endeavour to free
ourselves of habitual and unreflective modes of deliberation.
As I have tried to do so, I have come to conclude the following.
Displays of different aspects of what constitutes a human being
are not easily explained as stemming from a particular type of
influence. In fact, it seems to me an arduous, possibly impossible,
task to unfurl the complete determinants of the underlying set
of thoughts and behaviour which a human make. As a result, I am
highly suspicious against any system of analysis which proffer
a claim of exclusive knowledge - and therefore I view constructionism's
conviction, that only social forces matter in the field of human
sexuality, as - at best - problematic. I will try to elaborate
on why I have come to hold this position below.
II.
Let us begin by considering two
"essentialist"[4] and mutually exclusive
hypotheses about human sexuality:
(A) Humans have a fixed sexual orientation, determined at birth,
and it is that of perfect bisexuality. Social factors are irrelevant
both for determining a person's sexual orientation as well as
for people's understanding of this concept.[5]
(B) Humans have a fixed sexual orientation, determined at birth,
and for the entire population, it is distributed along a continuum,
ranging from exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive homosexuality.
Social factors are irrelevant both for determining a person's
sexual orientation as well as for people's understanding of this
concept.
A devout essentialist would presumably adhere to one of these
alternatives, and consider nothing else as of interest for an
evaluation of the basis or understanding of human sexuality. Such
a position is rightly considered absurd by constructionists and,
to my knowledge, held by no one.[6]
But saying that extreme essentialism is not tenable as
an explanatory device is not the same as saying that essentialism
cannot contribute fruitfully to an analysis of sexuality - in
fact, I view it as vital. The thing is to view hypothesis (A)
and (B), neither like constructionism (which categorically views
them both as false), nor like extreme essentialism (which views
one of them as a comprehensive concept containing the complete
truth), but as contributing to a proper explanation of
sexuality. That is to say, one may start with the idea that people
have an underlying sexual orientation, which is not chosen, which
is innate, which is immutable, but which is only one among many
factors determining the feelings and actions of sexual man. And
one may, in addition to this, think it plausible to add social
or cultural influences as vital in shaping people's conceptions
and actual behaviour.
Consequently, I view myself as a "weak" essentialist
in that I think there is an essence of the human personal set-up
which, largely irrespective of social discourse, is an identifying
feature with regard to sexual object choice.[7]
In terms of economic theory, a person's preference for the maximisation
of net utility is transformed into acts of choice subject to a
restriction called sexual orientation (in addition to many other
restrictions). Furthermore, I think hypothesis (B) to be predominantly
true - in conjunction with social considerations. In other words,
I believe that in "any" society in "any" age,
each person has a nonmalleable sexual orientation, but the way
in which a particular sexual orientation is understood, viewed,
treated, and experienced undoubtedly varies greatly, depending
on the cultural framework of the society in question. But underlying
all such frameworks is an essential reality, which is not socially
created, just socially interpreted.
Why think (B) more palatable than (A)? While (B) allows for the
existence of some people who are perfectly bisexual (i.e.,
they are roughly equally attracted sexually and emotionally to
men and women), (A) does not allow for anyone who deviates from
this orientation. And, starting from an essentialist base, it
is really introspection - both personal and having taking part
of that of friends - which makes me reject (A). I, and many of
my homosexual friends, have never been emotionally nor sexually
attracted to girls, and the same thing goes for some heterosexual
friends, who have thought about the issue: they have never been
attracted to anyone of the same gender in that manner. Thus, everyone
is not perfectly bisexual at base.[8]
III.
So let us continue in a comparison
of my own view, hypothesis (B+), and the constructionist hypothesis,
(C):
(B+) Humans have a fixed sexual orientation, and for the entire
population, it is distributed along a continuum, ranging from
exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive homosexuality. In addition
to a biological and individualistic-psychological basis, social
factors influence conceptions of and actions related to sexual
orientation.
(C) Humans do not have a fixed sexual orientation; instead, that
concept is a social construction which itself creates identities
not there beforehand. This does not exclude, nor does it necessitate,
people thinking in terms of their and others' having a
sexual orientation.
Is it possible to discriminate between these two hypotheses? While
it is clearly a monumental task to do so, I think it is possible,
bringing available scientific research to bear on the issue, to
at least make a case for one's position. While reading constructionist
theories, I have come to realise that they have something fundamental
in common with Freudianism, viz., that they are very hard to test
for falsifiablility.[9] To quote Hamer &
Copeland (1994): "[T]he social constructionist theory is
not likely to be disproved any time soon, since its content is
too amorphous to ever be tested rigorously."[10]
This makes it different from much of the research in the fields
of biology and psychology, which we shall come to in a while.
However, I think there are certain lines of reasoning which can
be pursued and which will present a case for the rejection of
(C) in favour of (B+).[11]
1. First, let us consider some historical and anthropological
research. History Professor John Boswell (see note 1) convincingly
shows that at least some people in classic Athens and Rome, as
well as in Arabic countries, understood human sexuality in terms
of stable sexual orientations. Hence, it is difficult, as e.g.
David M. Halperin does, to argue that homosexuality as such can
only be said to have existed in the modern West.[12]
Boswell's reading is that, just as in today's discussion, people
in history have had different ways of interpreting sexuality:
some have seen it as an isolated area for unaffected choice, some
have viewed it as being affected by "natures" or essential
"identities", etc. This renders higher credibility to
(B+) compared to a situation where all references to an orientation
view were absent.[13]
As for anthropological research, the Sambia of New Guinea provide
support for hypothesis (B+).[14] It is the
case that the Sambia men perform intergenerational same-sex acts
in a ritualised manner, but after puberty, they youths are expected
to form relationships with women. We may talk about a social or
cultural pattern here, which strongly influences behavior: both
in adolescence (same-sex acts) and in adulthood (opposite-sex
liaisons). However, even in this socially tight society, there
is a small minority of men who, despite social ostracism and scorn,
try to remain in same-sex bonds upon reaching adulthood. This
seems consistent with (B+) but not with (C).
2. Second, let us consider some research in biology and psychology
- a strong challenge to (C) - which is quite often rejected flatly
by constructionists as being of any significance for sexuality.[15]
As Foucault expresses it: "Sexuality must not be thought
of as a kind of natural given which power tries to check, or as
an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover.
It is the name that can be given to a historical construct."[16]
In contrast, biologists take another view, namely, that sexuality
is strongly influenced by natural, non-social factors, such as
genes, and that people's personal characteristics - in addition
to their bodies - are shaped by evolutionary forces, in the long
run.[17] However, environmental and social
influences are not denied. Naturally, this field of research is
still unable to deliver any conclusive proof about, e.g., the
extent and nature of a genetic origin of homosexuality, but preliminary
results makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that biology
does influence people's sexuality in a non-negligible manner.
Among the findings can be mentioned quite a few studies on homosexual
twins. To quote LeVay (1996, p. 175, 177): "Thus, although
the actual rates vary considerably from study to study, there
is agreement that the incidence of homosexuality is approximately
twice as high in the monozygotic co-twins of homosexual men and
women as in the dizygotic co-twins... On the whole the twin studies
offer substantial if not totally watertight evidence that there
is a genetic influence on sexual orientation, at least in men."
Another line of research has been conducted in the form of molecular
genetic studies, under the leadership of Dean Hamer at the U.S.
National Cancer Institute. Hamer & Copeland (1994) state:
"The first part of this book was grounded solidly on facts:
Most men identify themselves as either gay or straight. Each one
either has a gay brother or he doesn't. The brothers share the
same genetic markers at particular spots on their DNA or they
don't. Those are the facts that led to the conclusion that there
is a gene at the tip of the X chromosome that influences sexual
orientation, at least in some gay men."[18]
Furthermore, in the field of brain research, Simon LeVay has found
a difference in the brains of heterosexuals and homosexuals, in
a region called INAH3: on average, this region is two to three
times larger in heterosexual than homosexual men. Since this is
a sexually dimorphic cell group, the study suggests that there
may be a biological influence on sexual orientation.[19]
In addition to biological factors, like the effects of the brain,
genes, and hormones, quite a few psychologists have proffered
the view that local environmental factors are decisive for the
particular sexual orientation of a person.[20]
Note that this is not the same as the constructionist idea that
societal forces are at work and that this does not in any way
preclude a biological influence. In fact, many believe in a combination
of influencing factors, some biological, some psychological -
something which is supported by the twin studies (since identical
genes do not always produce the same sexual orientation).[21]
Among the psychological theories can be mentioned prenatal stress,
parenting styles, patterns of childhood reinforcement, early sexual
experience, and so on. It is difficult to say what the effects
of these factors are, but their influence cannot be rejected,.
In all, although not yet unambiguous, scientific research points
in a direction which lends support to (B+), not (C).
3. Third, let us consider how people view themselves. Here, we
encounter a problem, viz., the constructionist epistemological
view: people don't really know what made them what they are (if
they are anything at all except respondents to social stimuli)
- but the constructionists think they do know. On one plane,
this is not very strange: people observe a lot of things without
having any idea about why they are like they observe them to be.
But normally, if someone else claims to know, for such a claim
to be credible, he must present more than an unfalsifiable theory.
LeVay (1996) sums up:
"On the whole, the results of the various sex surveys suggest
that there is a good correlation between people's sexual orientation
as assessed by their feelings, their behavior, and their declared
identity. The survey results do not support the notion that, in
contemporary Western cultures, large numbers of men and women
are sexually attracted to the same sex but fail to act on that
attraction. The great majority of men and women have sex only
with members of the other sex, and they do so for a simple reason:
they don't find members of the same sex sexually attractive."[22]
It thus appears as if people claim that they do belong to a certain
sexual orientation, and my personal experience reinforces my belief
in these findings: I have always been sexually attracted to other
boys/men, which corresponds well with (B+). It cannot, of course,
be ruled out that I, and most others, have been misled by social
discourse to think that I am irrevocably gay by nature, but it
seems to me that the burden of proof rests on those who claim
to know more about me than I do.
4. Fourth, let us consider the vagueness of constructionism. Unlike
the research results briefly discussed above that render support
to the notion of a sexual orientation, constructionism is simply
a rather categorical theory which cannot be tested. It makes use
of abstract terms like "social construction" and claims
a positive conviction that homosexuality is nothing but such a
construction. On what grounds? Not the least important to ask
is how a certain mode of discourse influences individuals.
Both biology and psychology in this area are individually oriented,
i.e., they look at individual cases and offer explanations of
why people turned out in a certain way ("you were influenced
by gene x in your brain in this way" and "you were influenced
by your father being away all the time in this way"). Constructionism,
however, instead makes use of a cultural influence, but such generically
nebulous influences probably makes it impossible to explain individual
variation within a given cultural context.
How, for instance, can constructionism explain that I, Niclas
Berggren, turned out to only desire sex with other men, while
Karl Karlsson or Sven Svensson turned out to only desire sex with
females? If we lived in the same culture, what exactly and
specifically made me gay and others straight? Or, perhaps,
what exactly and specifically made me think
that I have a gay identity and others to think that they
have a straight identity? What exactly and specifically
makes a person gay (or think he is) in a culture which, according
to those constructionists who have a flair for "queer theory",
is violently heterosexist? If constructionism cannot credibly
answer such questions, it quite frankly appears rather useless
to me. Again: hypothesis (B+) stands on firmer ground.
5. Fifth, it appears that if one's sexuality was totally unrelated
to genetics, it would be less strong and easier to change. If
one takes ordinary beliefs and attitudes, continually shaped by
family, friends, and society, it is not all that difficult, over
the passage of time, to revise one's outlook on life. For instance,
during the course of my 28-year-old life, I have changed from
an agnostic, to a Fundamentalist Christian, to an atheist. But
my attempts to change my attraction toward men failed, despite
several years of hard trying. That a sexual orientation which
is exclusively homosexual is virtually impossible to change is
documented by Green (1988), and that a (male) homosexual orientation
in terms of self-identification is very stable, after initial
confusion in life, is shown by Lever (1994).[23]
Again, can such difficulty in transforming people (who themselves
often want to change) and such stability in terms of self-identification
be explained better by means of (B+) or (C)? Unless constructionists
explain why this social construction is so hard to escape, the
story seems much more in line with (B+).
IV.
Why does it matter if hypothesis
(A), (B), (B+), or (C) is correct? First of all, a general purpose
of scientific analysis is to provide correct and useful knowledge
about reality, and for those of us who have a basic belief in
the validity of such efforts, it does matter how reality is described.
Second, the normative issue involved is whether or not this should
matter for people's values. I think it should not. Thus, I believe
in treating others with respect no matter if their characteristics
are real or imagined. However, it has been shown that attitudes
toward homosexuals vary predictably with people's beliefs about
whether homosexuality is a choice or not: tolerance is much greater
in the latter group than in the former.[24]
Of course, it is hard - at least for me - to imagine what attitudes
would be like if everybody condoned the constructionist view of
how life works.
V.
Constructionists are fond of referring
to post-modernist thinking with reference to traditional ideas
about the constitution of the world, which are happily questioned.[25]
But shouldn't the post-modernist insights render constructionists
somewhat more humble regarding their own claims (especially since
many of them are diffuse and untestable)? How is it that constructionists
appear with almost religious dogmatism and proclaim than only
vague social constructions determine (beliefs about) sexuality?
How do they know?
My own position is one of balance, of taking several schools of
thought, of comparing them with each other and with my own experience,
and of forming a synthesis which states: I believe (but I do not
know with absolute certainty) that there is an essential feature
in humans which we can call sexual orientation and which entails
instructions on which gender toward which we feel sexual and emotional
attraction. But the way in which such instructions are interpreted
is highly culture-dependent, which means that the actual understanding
and manifestations of homosexuality probably differ quite a bit
over time and space. In all, however, I think there is a core
which we have in common. And, as a consequence, I deem social
constructionism a rather unappealing construction.
Notes
1. For a statement from one of
the most influential constructionist philosophers, see Michel
Foucault (1979). The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction.
London: Allen Lane. For an evaluative analysis, with which
I largely concur, see John Boswell (1989). "Revolutions, Universals, and Sexuality."
in Martin Duberman et al., Hidden from History: Reclaiming
the Gay and Lesbian Past. New York: Meridian.
2. This more general definition of social constructionism is found
in Ted Honderich (Ed.) (1995). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press: "Analysis of 'knowledge'
or 'reality' or both as contingent upon social relations, and
as made out of continuing human practices, by processes such as
reification, sedimentation, habitualization... Social constructionists
do not believe in the possibility of value-free foundations or
sources of knowledge, nor do they conceptualize a clear objective-subjective
distinction, or a clear distinction between 'knowledge' and 'reality'.
The position, therefore, has profound implications for the practice
and philosophy of science, and for political philosophy."
(p. 829)
3. For a definition, see The American Psychological Association.
4. Essentialism is often seen as the antithesis of constructionism
in claiming that some objects, no matter what their definitions
or descriptions, have properties that are timeless and immutable,
and these properties are not only requisite to their existence
but are expressed in their definitions and descriptions.
5. This may, interestingly, be considered conceptually similar
to stating that humans have no sexual orientation at all (i.e.,
that they are only sexual and that the sexual object choice is
gender-irrelevant).
6. A possibly even more absurd position is held by those who claim
that human sexual activities and emotions are entirely unrelated
to any external influence (biological, psychological, or
social factors). For a statement mildly along these lines, see
Christopher Toll (1996). "Att inte vara det man inte är"
["To Not Be what One Is Not"]. Svenska Dagbladet,
16 March. Also see my reply: Niclas Berggren (1996). "Att
välja irrationellt" ["To Choose Irrationally"].
Svenska Dagbladet, 31 March. Among other things, I argue
there that given a human capacity for rational choice, it cannot
convincingly be asserted that people choose to become homosexuals,
since that identification for most people entails a net cost,
in comparison with the alternative, heterosexuality. Furthermore,
as reported in Simon LeVay (1996). Queer Science: The Use and
Abuse of Research into Homosexuality. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press: "Most gay men and lesbian women have their own opinions
about why they are homosexual. Although there are exceptions,
gay men in the United States today generally tend to claim that
they were 'born gay'. Ninety percent of gay men surveyed by the
Advocate in 1994 claimed to have been born gay, and only
four percent believed that choice came into the equation at all."
(p. 6)
7. In discussing "identity", Margareta Lindholm (1996).
"Vad har sexualitet med kön att göra?" ["What
Does Sexuality Have to Do with Gender?"]. lambda nordica,
vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, November, p. 39, commits a fallacy in dismissing
the concept as a descriptive device on the basis of a normative
dislike (she believes that the kind of difference which the concept
of identity gives rise to, due to its exclusionary character,
unambiguously yields inequality). That is, she says x because
she dislikes ~x.
8. In "My Personal Story: Growing Up Gay",
I expand on this and show that I desperately tried to change into
a heterosexual for many years - to no avail. It is of course possible
(although, I think, highly implausible) that some sort of social
influences has transformed my basic sexual orientation into a
seemingly homosexual one, but unless someone who claims this to
be the case can be precise about how this has occurred, I am unwilling
to believe it.
9. Implicit in my own thinking is the philosophy of science of
Karl Popper (in which he stated that good theories have two properties:
They account for the maximum number of observations with the minimum
number of assumptions, and they make predictions that can be tested),
and to the extent that constructionism rejects that basis, claiming
that no science is objective and that there is no reliable knowledge,
then we part ways on a fundamental level. In any case, if that
is the position taken, then one might as well reject constructionism,
not like I do, with logical reasoning, but simply by saying that
we remain total agnostics in every area, and that's it. I think
this a destructive approach. As someone active in the social sciences,
my firm view is that the scientific control process over time
ensures the overall honesty and reliability of research. See also
Andrew Sullivan (1995). Virtually Normal: An Argument about
Homosexuality. London: Picador, pp. 68-69, for a critique
of the views of constructionists on science.
10. Dean Hamer & Peter Copeland (1994). The Science of
Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene and the Biology of Behavior.
New York: Simon & Schuster. P. 177.
11. It is of interest to note that the Catholic Church has recently
changed its understanding of homosexuality from a choice-oriented
perspective to one which recognises the idea of sexual orientation.
As stated in Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994). London:
Geoffrey Chapman: "The number of men and women who have deep-seated
homosexual tendencies is not negligible. They do not choose their
condition; for most of them it is a trial." (§2358)
12. David M. Halperin (1990). One Hundred Years of Homosexuality
and other Essays on Greek Love. New York: Routledge. However,
as pointed out to me by Andreas Ehrencrona,
sometimes the discussion is merely semantic. If the claim is that
what is meant by using the term "gay" or "homosexual"
in our culture today is not exactly applicable to other cultures,
then I am willing to acquiesce in that claim. But I do not believe
in the claim that the underlying, essential phenomenon described
by those words merely exists in our culture.
13. For an explanation why it seems that sexually permissive societies
primarily view homosexuals as distinct persons and why sexually
repressive societies view them as heterosexuals committing wicked
deeds, see Richard A. Posner (1992). Sex and Reason. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, p. 125. For an argument on how people
could and did formulate equivalent concepts to the more modern
"homosexuality", see Richard D. Mohr (1992). Gay
Ideas: Outing and Other Controversies. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, pp. 221-242.
14. See Gilbert Herdt & Robert J. Stoller (1990). Intimate
Communications: Erotics and the Study of Culture. New York:
Columbia University Press. See also David F. Greenberg (1988).
The Construction of Homosexuality. Chicago, IL: The University
of Chicago Press.
15. For a reply to this type of constructionist claim (as exemplified
by, e.g., the historian Jens Rydström (1995). "Jakten
efter det normala" ["The Pursuit of the Normal"].
Svenska Dagbladet, 8 December), see Magnus Enquist &
Hans Temrin (1996). "Naturligt är mångfalden"
["Diversity is Natural"]. Svenska Dagbladet,
7 January.
16. Ibid., p. 105.
17. See Posner, ibid., ch. 4; Hamer, ibid.; LeVay, ibid.; The
Economist (1995), 4 November, pp. 97-98; Robert Wright
(1994). The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are. The New
Science of Evolutionary Psychology. London: Abacus.
18. Hamer & Copeland, ibib., p. 149.
19. LeVay, ibid., pp. 143-147.
20. The American Psychological Association agrees with the outlook
of this essay in believing in the existence of a "sexual
orientation", as does The American Psychiatric Association.
21. See LeVay, ibid., pp. 273-274. See also Lars Bohman (1995).
Man och man emellan - En bok om manlig homosexualitet.
[Between Men: A Book on Male Homosexuality]. Stockholm:
Natur och Kultur, pp. 69-104.
22. See LeVay, ibid., p.52.
23. See Richard Green (1988). "The Immutability of (Homo)sexual
Orientation: Behavioral Science Implications for a Constitutional
(Legal) Analysis." Journal of Psychiatry and Law,
16, pp. 537-568. See J. Lever (1994). "Sexual Revelations:
The 1994 Advocate Survey of Sexuality and Relationships: The Men."
23 August, pp. 17-24. See also The American Psychiatric Association.
24. See LeVay, ibid., pp. 3-4. I do not mean that constructionism
claims that being gay is a choice; that is more typical of Fundamentalist
Christians. I am simply using this finding to illustrate that
factual interpretations of reality de facto matter for
people's values.
25. See e.g. Pia Laskar (1996). "Queer teori och feminismen"
["Queer Theory and Feminism"]. lambda nordica,
vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, November, p. 77.