Let us begin by distinguishing between three approaches to the valuing of human features or actions (here denoted by x):
The first approach is Kantian in inspiration, and I think it absurd. It says that x is to be valued even if it has been forced and even if it gives rise to bad consequences. I will not deal with it further here. As for the second approach, it seems to underlie most condemnations of the valuing of human beauty, but as I believe it rests on a central error, I will try to show that it is unsound and that, instead, approach three is the one to opt for.
A central tenet of my view, that it is perfectly acceptable to value human beauty, is that man has no free will (see my essay ”Is There a Proper Role for Ethics?” for a more precise argumentation on this issue). This implies that no one is praiseworthy or blameworthy for any characteristic or achievement at all. If the ultimate determinants of all human features — whether physical or mental — lie outside the individual possessing a certain set-up of them, then there is no factual basis for thinking it more right or better to value some quality of a person more than another. Just as it is acceptable to value a person for having worked hard and achieved intellectual or material success, it is acceptable to value a person for being beautiful.
Here we see a grave problem with the second approach
above. It seems to say:
Premise 1. It is only acceptable to value
human characteristics for which a person can take credit.
Definition. By ”take credit” is meant
that the characteristic in question has been brought about by free human
action.
Premise 2. Human beauty is not a characteristic
for which a person can take credit.
Conclusion. Hence, valuing human beauty
is not acceptable.
But since the definition contains an incorrect assumption of free will, the conclusion cannot be established. Premise 2 is correct, but an important thing to note is that the same thing applies to all human characteristics.
Hence we face a choice: either we think it wrong to value any human characteristic, or we think it permissible to value any human characteristic which we, on balance, consider beneficial for giving rise to good consequences. Presently, I will argue for the second alternative. Again, we do not face a choice of thinking some human characteristic worthy of being valued because brought about by free human action whilst, at the same time, thinking some other such characteristic unworthy of being valued because not brought about in that manner.
As for the first alternative, thinking it wrong to value any human characteristic, few people understandably advocate it. It would, among other things, render love or any type of attraction wrong, and it would also make it impermissible to value goodness, e.g., feeding starving children. It is a position which is possible according to the facts of this world, but it is absurd in my opinion, since it brings about misery, given human nature’s propensity to want to value things. Let us therefore scrap it..
As for the second alternative, it is the only possible alternative left, given our understanding of how the world functions. It does not say that it is alright to admire beauty, intelligence, or some physical or mental effort because they are the result of some admirable action, but because such admiration gives rise to good consequences. Two good consequences that can be mentioned: it creates incentives for people to try more to achieve what is considered good by others and it creates a sensation of pleasure or happiness in the admirers, an effect which is further reinforced by the incentive effect just mentioned. As for beauty, people will try to appear more beautiful if others value beauty and beauty creates in the eyes of the beholder strong feelings of pleasure.
What consequentialist argument could be raised against valuing people for being beautiful? (We have already established that it cannot be considered wrong to value a characteristic, be it beauty or something else, because it is not the result of genuinely free human action. No characteristics are.)
As I see it, the main argument on the con side is that valuing people for being beautiful necessarily brings with it a condemnation of human ugliness, which creates unhappiness for those who think themselves ugly. This may be true, but I do not view it as convincing when making a balanced assessment.
First of all, valuing any human characteristic necessarily brings with it not valuing the absence of that characteristic. Should we hence say that it is wrong to value anything human? As remarked above, this is an absurd view. Second, if the problem of valuing beauty is not qualitatively different than that of valuing other characteristics, is it quantitatively different? Objectively, it is hard to see that there should be any such difference, but I still think there might be. How so? As long as people think that it is right to value other characteristics or achievements than beauty, they can also find it understandable why the absence of those characteristics or achievements are not valued. And as long as they think that valuing beauty is wrong (because they mistakenly think that there is free will), they might consider the non-valuation of ugliness easier to bear.
There are, however, ways of mitigating this possible problem, by putting some limits on how valued characteristics are used in various contexts. E.g., valuing x does not entail harassing those who do not possess x: on a consequentialist ethics, it is viewed as undesirable to harass people, period. Also, we might think it unwise to base the offering of positions on the basis of beauty, unless beauty in some clear way is essential for carrying out the job well. If intelligence and an education is needed for a job, and not beauty, beauty should not be a determinant factor for the hiring decision.
To conclude, I do not think there are convincing
arguments against the general valuing of people for being beautiful. It
creates happiness, on net, and should therefore be welcomed. Potential
problems can be palliated. Stating that it is wrong to value beauty on
non-consequentialist grounds is factually erroneous or absurd and would
create misery: people cannot avoid valuing things, and beauty is one of
the things most strongly admired. Since no grave negative consequences
need follow from such admiration, I think it good. Hence, the next time
you here someone say: ”You should only value people for what is on their
inside, not what is on their outside!”, send them to this page — and persevere
in valuing people for their beauty (among other things, if you wish).