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نداء الى كتاب
مثقفي خانقين في الداخل والخارج
Arabization
Khanaqin Arabization
kirkuk arabization
Mandali arabization
Iraq: Kurds Pushing For Federalism
Iraq: Crunch Time For Kurds, But New Problems On The Horizon
anfal kurdistan iraq
------------------------------------Kurdistan -
Kurdish Conflict
Kurdish Conflict
kurdish Wars
kurdish genocide
Kurdistan - Overview
Kurdistan - Maps
Kurdistan - Iraq
Kurdistan - Iran
Kurdistan - Turkey
Combatants
United States (Operation Iraqi
Freedom)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
References
The Houston Chronicle:
Kurds have a big stake in the war Mar 23, 2003
KURDISTAN WEB
a non-lucrative private initiative not related to any political party or
organization
Washington Kurdish
Institute (WKI) a non-profit, research and educational organization whose
motto is "For Kurdish People Worldwide".
Washington Kurdish
Institute (WKI) a non-profit, research and educational organization whose
motto is "For Kurdish People Worldwide".
Kurdistan - Kurdish Conflict The Kurd population, probably numbering close to 16 million, inhabits the
wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern part of Syria through
Soviet
Azarbaijan and Iraq to the northwest of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. About half
of all Kurds worldwide live in Turkey. Most of the rest live in
adjacent regions
of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. They represent by far the largest
non-Arab ethnic
minority of Iraq, accounting in 1987 for about 19 percent
of the population, or
around 3.1 million, and also Turkey's largest non- Turkish ethnic group.
In Turkey, the Kurds are concentrated in eleven provinces of the southeast, the same area that their ancestors inhabited when Xenophon mentioned the
Kurds
in the fifth century B.C. There also are isolated Kurdish villages in other parts of Turkey. Kurds have been migrating to Istanbul for centuries, and since 1960 they have migrated to almost all other urban centers as well. There are
Kurdish neighborhoods, for example, in many of the gecekondus or shantytowns, which have grown up around large cities in western Turkey. Turkey's censuses do
not list Kurds as a separate ethnic group. Consequently, there are no reliable
data
on their total numbers. In 1995, estimates of the number of Kurds in Turkey
ranged
from 6 million to 12 million.
In Iraq, the Kurdish dialect of Kurmanji is divided into North Kurmanji (also
called Bahdinani) and South Kurmanji (also called Sorani). South Kurmanji, or
Sorani, is the language
of a plurality of Kurds in Iraq. Major subdialects of
South Kurmanji are Mukri, Ardalani, Garmiyani, Khushnow, Pizhdar, Warmawa,
Kirmanshahi, and Arbili (or Sorani proper). Kurds in Iraq are the overwhelming
majority in As Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk governorates. Although the
government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly also a majority in
the
region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oil-producing area. Kurds are settled
as far south as Khanaqin. Once mainly nomadic or seminomadic, Kurdish society
was characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and pastoral
tribes since at least the Ottoman period. By the nineteenth century,
about 20
percent of Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As
Sulaymaniyah,
and Irbil. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young
intelligentsia, helped develop
Kurdish nationalism. Since the early 1960s, the
urban Kurdish areas have grown rapidly.
Kurdish migration--in addition to being
part of the general trend of urban migration-- was prompted by the escalating
armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad,
the destruction of
villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural disasters as a severe
drought in the 1958-61 period. In addition to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting has hindered the development of education, health, and other
services.
There are approximately 4 million Kurds in Iran. They are the third most
important ethnic
group in the country after the Persians and Azarbaijanis and
account for about 9 percent
of the total population. They are concentrated in
the Zagros Mountain area along the western frontiers with Turkey and Iraq and
adjacent to the Kurdish populations of both those countries.
The Kurdish area of
Iran includes most of West Azarbaijan, all of Kordestan, much of Bakhtaran (formerly known as Kermanshahan) and Ilam, and parts of Lorestan. Historically,
the Kurds of
Iran have been both urban and rural, with as much as half the rural
population practicing pastoral nomadism in different periods of history. By the
mid-1970s, fewer than 15 percent of all Kurds
were nomadic. In addition, during
the 1970s there was substantial migration of rural Kurds to such historic
Kurdish cities as Bakhtaran (known as Kermanshah until 1979), Sanandaj, and
Mahabad,
as well as to larger towns such as Baneh, Bijar, Ilam, Islamabad (known
as Shahabad until 1979),
Saqqez, Sar-e Pol-e Zahab, and Sonqor. Educated Kurds
also migrated to non-Kurdish cities such
as Karaj, Tabriz, and Tehran. There are
also scatterings of Kurds in the provinces of Fars, Kerman, and Baluchestan va
Sistan, and there is a large group of approximately 350,000 living in a small
area of northern Khorasan. These are all descendants of Kurds whom the
government forcibly removed
from western Iran during the seventeenth century.
The Kurds speak a variety of closely related dialects, which in Iran are
collectively called Kirmanji. The dialects are divided into northern and
southern groups, and it is not uncommon for the Kurds living in adjoining
mountain valleys to speak different dialects. There is a small body of Kurdish literature written in a modified Arabic script. Kurdish is more closely related
to Persian than is Baluchi and also contains numerous Persian loanwords. In
large Kurdish cities, the educated population speaks both Persian and Kurdish.
Although the Kurds comprise a distinct ethnic group, they are divided by
class, regional, and sectarian differences similar to those affecting ethnic
Turks. Religious divisions often have been a source of
conflict among the Kurds.
Although the government of Turkey does not compile official data on
religious
affiliation, scholars estimate that at least two-thirds of the Kurds in Turkey
nominally are
Sunni Muslims, and that as many as one-third are Shia Muslims of
the Alevi sect. Unlike the
Sunni Turks, who follow the Hanafi school of Islamic
law, the Sunni Kurds follow the Shafii
school. Like their Turkish counterparts,
adult male Kurds with religious inclinations tend to
join Sufi brotherhoods. The
Naksibendi and Kadiri orders, both of which predate the republic, have large
Kurdish followings in Turkey although their greatest strength is among the Kurds
of Iran. The Nurcular, a brotherhood that came to prominence during the early
republican years, also
has many Kurdish adherents in Turkey.
Whereas the number of Kurds belonging to the Alevi sect of Shia Islam is
uncertain, the majority
of Alevi are either Arabs or Turks. Historically, the
Alevi lived in isolated mountain communities in
southeastern Turkey and western
Syria. The Kurdish Alevi have been migrating from their villages to the cities
of central Anatolia since the 1950s. Whereas Kurdish and Turkish Alevi generally have good relations, the competition between Alevi and Sunni Turks for urban
jobs led to a revival of traditional sectarian tensions by the mid-1970s. These
intertwined economic and religious tensions culminated in a series of violent
sectarian clashes in Kahramanmaras, Corum, and other cities in
1978-79 in which
hundreds of Alevi died.
A small but unknown number of Kurds also adhere to the secretive Yazidi sect,
which historically
has been persecuted by both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Small
communities of Yazidi live in Mardin,
Siirt, and Sanli Urfa provinces. Yazidi
are also found among Kurds in Armenia, Iran, and Iraq.
In Turkey the Yazidi
believe that the government does not protect them from religious persecution.
Consequently, as many as 50 percent of all Yazidi have immigrated to Germany,
where they feel free to practice their heterodox form of Islam.
Class differences also divide the Kurds. Wealthy landowners in rural areas
and entrepreneurs in
urban areas tend to cooperate with the government and
espouse assimilation. Many of these Kurds
are bilingual or even speak Turkish
more comfortably than Kurdish, which they disparage as the
language of the
uneducated. The economic changes that began in the 1960s have exacerbated
the
differences between the minority of assimilated Kurds and the majority who have
retained a Kurdish identity. Militant Kurdish political groups such as the PKK
have exploited these
class differences since 1984.
In Iran, the majority of both rural and urban Kurds in West Azarbaijan and
Kordestan practice Sunni Islam. There is more diversity of religious practice in
southern Kurdish areas, especially in
the Bakhtaran area, where many villagers
and townspeople follow Shia beliefs. Schismatic
Islamic groups, such as the
Ahl-e Haqq and the Yazdis, both of which are considered heretical
by orthodox
Shias, traditionally have had numerous adherents among the Kurds of the
Bakhtaran region. A tiny minority of Kurds are adherents of Judaism.
In 2003, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq led to developments
for Iraq's Kurdish population. The Iraqi Kurds expressed interest in a federal
system of government that would grant
them a measure of autonomy. As of May
2003, the US had maintained that any government installed
in Iraq would be voted
on by a parliament, made of groups representing the Iraqi population.
The Kurds
would clearly represent a minority in that parliament.
Kurds are distinct from the Arabs, Turks, and Persians (Iranians) of their
region, but are ethnically
and linguistically closest to Persians. Kurdish
origins are commonly traced back to the Empire
of the Medes in the sixth century
BC.
Kurds live in the mountainous region of the Middle East where the
borders of Turkey, Syria,
Iraq and Iran meet. There are an estimated 20-25
million Kurds throughout the Middle East.
The region they inhabit is sometimes
called Kurdistan, although this does not refer to a political designation. The
Kurds have always been a stateless people.
The name “Kurd” was a generic term used to denote nomads, and non-Arabs
in particular. In Kurdish, the name “Kurd” means “warrior” or “ferocious
fighter.” By the time of the Islamic conquest of the northern Middle East in the
7th century AD, the name “Kurd” was already
in use as a term to designate the
population of Western Iranians in the Zagros Mountains.
Kurds in Iraq make up 15-20 percent of the Iraqi population of 24
million, or about
4-5 million people. The number of Kurds in Iraq is a disputed
issue, and the Kurds accuse
the Iraqi government of undercounting the Kurds to
reduce their status as a significant minority.
By the beginning of the 16th century, the Shia Safavid (Iranian) Empire
had emerged as a rival
to the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds found themselves in the
middle of the territories claimed by the Sunni Turkic Ottomans and the Shia
Persian Safavids. The two empires fought at the Battle
of Chaldiran in 1514,
where the Ottomans defeated the Safavid Shah. The result of the battle
established a boundary between the two empires that split the Kurds between
Turkic and Persian empires.
Kurdish cultural identity has been fundamentally influenced by their
experience at the intersection
of the Turkic, Persian and Arab cultures. These
three cultures have dominated Kurdish culture, in part because of the empire and
state borders that have prevented coordination and unity
within the larger
Kurdish population.
From the mid-16th century through World War I, the Ottoman Empire ruled
three provinces or vilayets Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul that comprise contemporary
Iraq. The Kurdish area
in modern-day Iraq was part of the Mosul vilayet.
Iraqi Kurdish areas span three provinces: Dohuk, Arbil, and
Sulaymaniyah of Iraq. Kurds also
comprise a substantial portion of the
population in and around Kirkuk, and live as far south as Khanaqin.
Kurds in Iraq are divided between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) factions in northern Iraq. These
entities are
political-military-tribal organizations. The KDP and PUK are
currently cooperating with each other, although they fought a civil war in 1996.
Kurds consider Kirkuk, a 5,000 year old city and a center of oil
production, as the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, even though it is under Iraqi
government control and even though it contains more Arabs than Kurds.
Both the
KDP and the PUK regard Kirkuk as a key piece in their plan for a secure and
economically
viable independent Kurdistan.
Kurds speak Kurdish, which is a language distinct from Arabic, Turkish
and Persian . There are several
dialects of the Kurdish language that are
specific to different regions of Kurdistan. In Iraq, the dominant
dialects are
Kurmanji (Northern) Kurdish and Surani (Southern) Kurdish.
Almost all Kurds are Muslim. Kurdish Muslims are mostly of the Sunni
branch, but mainly follow
the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam, which distinguishes
them from the majority of the Iraqi Arab Sunni Muslim population, which is
primarily of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. There is also
a strong Sufi
mystic following among the Kurds. Sufism contributes to a less orthodox practice
of Islam among much of the Kurdish population.
Most of the Kurds who are of the Shia branch of Islam are called Faili
Kurds. The Faili Kurds live around Kirkuk and south to Khanaqin. Many of the
Faili Kurds support the PUK.
Over time, the Kurds’ physical location on the border of empires and
modern nation-states has had
a significant impact on Kurdish identity. Kurds see
themselves as not only existing without a state, but as existing between and
across states. This influences how they view external powers and gives
them a
highly tactical view of alliances.
Tribal connections remain a source of social ties in Iraqi Kurdish
society. Although almost all Kurds are permanently settled and earn their
livelihood from agriculture, handicrafts or industrial work, tribal ties are a
source of support in times of hardship and can still be use to mobilize
communities against outside interference.
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